Nelson: Tren de Aragua, a Primer
I worked with Nelson to prepare this primer on Tren de Aragua. I iterated with Nelson on each specific section, prompting him and iterating with him until I was happy with the result. Image: DALL-E.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
The Tren de Aragua (TDA) materialized in 2004-2005 within the confines of Tocorón Prison in Venezuela's Aragua state, coinciding with Hugo Chávez's declaration of a "prison emergency." The organization derived its name from an incomplete railway project near the prison facility. Under the leadership of Héctor Rustherford Guerrero Flores, known as "Niño Guerrero," alongside key figures Larry Alvarez ("Larry Changa") and Yohan José Guerrero ("Johan Petricia"), the organization underwent a remarkable transformation. Its evolution can be traced through three distinct phases. The initial period from 2005 to 2013 saw the group consolidating its power base within the prison system. From 2013 to 2018, the organization expanded its influence across Venezuela's regions. Since 2018, the TDA has leveraged the Venezuelan migration crisis to establish an international presence, following migration routes throughout Latin America.
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS
The TDA's relationship with Venezuela's political establishment, particularly the Maduro regime, has been instrumental in its growth and operational capacity. At the highest levels of government, the organization has maintained significant connections with figures such as Iris Varela, who served as prison minister before becoming National Assembly vice president. This relationship exemplifies the complex interweaving of criminal and political interests within Venezuela. The organization has successfully cultivated relationships with law enforcement officials and regional political figures, creating a protective network that enables their operations. The Maduro regime's policies, particularly those related to forced expatriation and prison management, have inadvertently or deliberately provided the TDA with opportunities for expansion. Most notably, the organization has maintained Tocorón Prison as its operational headquarters, exercising near-complete control over the facility with minimal government interference.
EARLY CRIMINAL RELATIONSHIPS
The TDA's foundational period was characterized by strategic relationship-building within Venezuela's evolving criminal landscape. The organization's development was deeply influenced by the "pranato" system, a prison governance structure where leaders known as "pranes" exercised considerable control over internal operations. This system gave rise to larger organizational structures called "Trenes" and smaller subgroups known as "carros del tren," establishing a hierarchical framework that would later facilitate the group's expansion. During this period, the TDA began forming alliances with Colombian guerrilla groups at border crossings and developed connections with Brazil's Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which would later prove crucial for their expansion into the Southern Cone. Simultaneously, the organization maintained working relationships with Venezuelan "colectivos" - armed political groups - and other "megabandas," creating a complex network of criminal alliances that continues to evolve.
TRANSNATIONAL EXPANSION OF THE TREN DE ARAGUA
The Tren de Aragua's international expansion represents one of the most significant developments in Latin American organized crime over the past decade. Beginning in 2018, under the leadership of Héctor Rustherford Guerrero Flores, known as "Niño Guerrero," the organization initiated a carefully orchestrated expansion beyond Venezuela's borders. Operating from their stronghold in Tocorón Prison, the group first established a presence in Colombia, specifically targeting La Parada and Bogotá, areas that served as primary reception points for Venezuelan migrants.
By early 2019, the organization had successfully extended its reach into Peru, establishing operational cells in Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo. The expansion continued southward into Chile, where the group first secured territory in the northern border towns of Arica and Tarapacá before penetrating deeper into the country, eventually reaching Santiago and Concepción. This expansion was facilitated by key lieutenants including Larry Alvarez ("Larry Changa") and Yohan José Guerrero ("Johan Petricia"), who helped implement the organization's strategic vision.
September 2023 marked a critical turning point in the organization's history when Venezuelan authorities conducted a massive raid on Tocorón Prison. This operation fundamentally altered TDA's organizational structure, forcing the group to adapt its operational model. Rather than diminishing the organization's effectiveness, however, the loss of their central base appeared to accelerate their international expansion. The group demonstrated remarkable resilience, establishing new operational hubs across multiple countries while strengthening their presence in Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia.
By December 2024, the organization had established a significant presence in the United States, with confirmed activities in at least 16 states. Particularly notable was their expansion into Aurora, Colorado, where they leveraged a Venezuelan diaspora community of approximately 30,000 residents. Throughout this expansion, TDA maintained a consistent strategy of following Venezuelan migration patterns, establishing presence in border crossing points known as "trochas," major urban centers with significant Venezuelan populations, strategic trafficking corridors, and areas characterized by weak state presence or high levels of corruption.
This expansion pattern demonstrates TDA's sophisticated understanding of territorial control and their ability to adapt to varying political and social contexts. The organization's growth from a prison-based gang to a transnational criminal enterprise represents a new model of criminal expansion in Latin America, one that effectively leverages migration patterns, diaspora communities, and institutional weaknesses across multiple nations.
THE TREN DE ARAGUA FRANCHISE MODEL
The Tren de Aragua's franchise model represents a significant departure from traditional criminal organizational structures, setting it apart from other transnational criminal groups like MS-13. This innovative approach to criminal expansion combines elements of business franchising with territorial control strategies, creating a unique operational framework that has proven remarkably effective across diverse geographical contexts.
At its core, the model operates through a brand licensing system where local criminal groups can operate under the Tren de Aragua name in exchange for financial considerations. These arrangements typically involve profit-sharing agreements, firepower contributions, or pre-negotiated deals with the central organization. Local groups often identify themselves as "trenes" or "tren de X," leveraging the fear and legitimacy associated with the TDA brand. Unlike traditional business franchises, however, these arrangements are characterized by informal agreements rather than standardized contracts, and there is no formal operations manual or strict quality control measures.
The organization's financial structure is notably diverse and adaptable. Rather than implementing a standardized licensing fee structure, TDA's economic model varies by location and operational focus. According to a July 2024 analysis, TDA's financial operations are decentralized, with different factions generating income through various means while maintaining varying degrees of connectivity to South American TDA leadership. The organization's revenue streams include money exchange and transfer services, utilizing cryptocurrency for both licit and illicit fund movements, human trafficking and smuggling operations, prostitution rings, and the movement of both illicit goods (drugs, cash, weapons) and illegally obtained legal goods.
The organizational structure maintains a notably flat hierarchy with significant local autonomy. Semi-autonomous cells operate independently within their territories, maintaining considerable decision-making power over their criminal activities. This decentralized approach allows local franchises to adapt their operations to specific territorial conditions while maintaining loose affiliations with the broader organization. The flexibility of this model has proven particularly effective in the post-September 2023 period, following the Venezuelan government's raid on Tocorón Prison, as it allowed the organization to maintain operations despite the disruption of its central command structure.
The franchise model's success stems from its ability to balance central brand control with local operational autonomy. Local groups benefit from the intimidation factor associated with the TDA name while maintaining the freedom to adapt their criminal activities to local market conditions. This arrangement has proven particularly effective in new territories where established criminal groups may seek to enhance their status by associating with the TDA brand, while the central organization benefits from rapid expansion with minimal operational overhead. The model has proven particularly effective in territories where TDA has either overpowered local criminal groups, as seen in Peru, or forced collaboration, as evidenced by their likely partnership with Colombia's Gulf Clan in migrant smuggling operations.
This approach differs significantly from more rigidly structured criminal organizations like MS-13, which maintains stricter hierarchical control and standardized operational protocols. The TDA's more flexible model has enabled rapid expansion across diverse geographical and cultural contexts, while minimizing the organizational vulnerabilities typically associated with more centralized criminal structures.
TREN DE ARAGUA'S U.S. EXPANSION AND TCO DESIGNATION
The Tren de Aragua's penetration into the United States represents a significant evolution in the organization's international reach. First detected in 2023, TDA's presence in the U.S. grew rapidly, leveraging established Venezuelan diaspora communities and exploiting vulnerabilities in the immigration system. By December 2024, the Department of Homeland Security had identified alleged TDA members operating across 16 states, with particularly notable concentrations in areas with significant Venezuelan populations.
Aurora, Colorado emerged as a key operational hub, capitalizing on a Venezuelan diaspora community of approximately 30,000 residents. The organization established a significant presence across multiple states including Texas (notably El Paso), New York, Illinois, Florida, Louisiana, Indiana, Georgia, Virginia, New Jersey, and Arizona. This expansion has been opportunistic rather than strategically planned, following Venezuelan migration patterns. According to retired FBI special agent Daniel Brunner, there isn't evidence of a "master plan" for U.S. expansion. Instead, the group has embedded within Venezuelan diaspora communities, particularly taking advantage of areas where Temporary Protected Status policies reduce deportation fears.
The organization's U.S. operations encompass a diverse portfolio of criminal activities, though notably different from their more violent operations in South America. These include retail drug trafficking, with a particular focus on "tusi" (pink cocaine), as well as wallet and phone theft schemes. The group has also developed sophisticated financial operations, including money exchange and transfer services, and cryptocurrency operations.
The scale and nature of TDA's human trafficking and prostitution operations in the U.S. differ significantly from their Latin American model. In Latin America, TDA operates large-scale, sophisticated trafficking networks characterized by complete control over the trafficking process, extreme violence, circulation of murder videos as intimidation tactics, and control of entire sex work territories, particularly in locations like La Parada, Colombia. These operations include traditional brothels, online exploitation, systematic recruitment through false job offers, debt bondage, and sophisticated logistics managed by dedicated personnel known as "asesors" who handle paperwork and transportation. In contrast, U.S. operations maintain a lower profile, operating through informal networks rather than controlled territories, using online platforms and messaging apps, and focusing more on prostitution rings than large-scale trafficking operations.
The group's expansion caught the attention of U.S. law enforcement, leading to approximately 100 federal investigations and roughly 50 arrests and convictions. This growing presence prompted a significant response from the U.S. government, culminating in the Department of Treasury's designation of TDA as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) in July 2024. This designation marked a crucial shift in the U.S. government's approach to combating the organization, providing law enforcement with enhanced tools and resources to target TDA's operations.
However, U.S. authorities face significant obstacles in combating TDA's expansion. These challenges include limited information sharing with Venezuelan authorities, difficulty in verifying TDA membership, challenges in distinguishing genuine members from those falsely claiming affiliation, and limited ability to verify criminal records from Venezuela. The organization's ability to embed within immigrant communities and exploit Temporary Protected Status policies has further complicated enforcement efforts, creating a complex challenge for law enforcement agencies across multiple jurisdictions.
TREN DE ARAGUA'S FTO DESIGNATION
On February 20, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio officially designated the TDA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), alongside several Mexican cartels and the MS-13. This designation stemmed from an executive order signed by President Donald Trump on his first day in office, marking a significant shift in how the U.S. government approaches transnational criminal organizations in Latin America.
The designation has sparked debate among security experts and regional analysts. According to Stephanie Brewer, director for Mexico at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the designation "fundamentally misunderstands how these criminal operations work." Brewer argues that while the U.S. can now impose stiffer penalties and obtain warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the terrorist designation does not significantly enhance existing tools to combat these groups.
Critics point out that TDA, unlike traditional terrorist organizations, does not pursue political objectives or operate under an ideological framework. Rather, it functions as a predatory criminal structure focused on territorial control and revenue extraction. According to available analysis, TDA is better understood as a criminal enterprise with ties to the Maduro regime than a terrorist organization with clear political, ideological, or theological motivations.
The designation has prompted other countries to follow suit. By February 25, 2025, Argentina joined the United States, Canada, and Ecuador in declaring TDA a terrorist organization. Argentina's Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich, announced that this designation means "freezing of assets, blocking of operations and total persecution" of TDA members and associates.
However, the designation raises concerns about potential unintended consequences. As Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, an organized crime expert, notes, these networks have complex supply chains and connections in the United States that make such designations problematic. There are also concerns about the impact on everyday people, organizations, and businesses that might inadvertently become entangled in the framework of providing material support to designated terrorist groups.
IMPLICATIONS OF TDA'S FTO DESIGNATION FOR U.S. BUSINESSES
The February 2025 designation of Tren de Aragua as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) creates significant challenges for U.S. businesses operating in Latin America. This designation, while intended to enhance law enforcement capabilities, introduces complex compliance requirements and operational risks for companies across multiple sectors.
The legal framework surrounding FTO designation creates three primary concerns that businesses must understand. First, the Material Support Law prohibits any U.S. person or organization from providing "material support" to a designated FTO. This concept is broader than many realize, encompassing services, financial transactions, transportation, training, and expert advice or assistance. Second, the law employs a "knowing" standard, meaning businesses can be held liable if they knew, should have known, or were "willfully blind" to evidence of TDA involvement. Third, the law operates under strict liability, meaning there's no minimum threshold for violations. Even small or inadvertent transactions can trigger criminal penalties, civil fines, asset freezes, and loss of export privileges.
These legal requirements create practical challenges across multiple business sectors. In transportation and logistics, U.S. companies shipping through Venezuela's Puerto Cabello must now verify that their local trucking contractors don't pay protection money to TDA. Companies using cross-border shipping routes between Colombia and Venezuela must ensure their logistics providers aren't using TDA-controlled "trochas" (informal crossing points). In northern Chile, warehousing operations must verify that security contractors aren't affiliated with TDA protection rackets.
The real estate and construction sectors face similar challenges. U.S. hotel chains expanding in Peru must verify that their local construction contractors aren't paying extortion fees to TDA. Companies renting warehouse space in Aurora, Colorado must conduct enhanced due diligence on property management companies. Real estate investments in areas with large Venezuelan diaspora communities require additional screening of property managers and maintenance contractors.
Financial services face particularly complex challenges. Banks must enhance screening of money transfer services, particularly in areas with large Venezuelan populations. Investment firms need to verify that local partners aren't using TDA-linked money exchange services. Companies must scrutinize cryptocurrency transactions that might involve TDA's money laundering operations.
Employment and labor practices require significant adaptation. Companies must enhance background checks for employees in regions with TDA presence, HR departments need new procedures to verify employment histories from Venezuela, and temporary staffing agencies must implement additional screening for Venezuelan applicants.
Supply chain management becomes increasingly complex under the FTO designation. Companies sourcing materials from Venezuela's mining sector must verify suppliers aren't paying TDA protection money. Retailers must ensure their suppliers aren't using TDA-controlled transportation routes, and food service companies must verify their suppliers aren't paying protection money in TDA-controlled markets.
What makes this particularly challenging is that TDA operates both legitimate and illegitimate businesses. A U.S. company might unknowingly hire a TDA-controlled transportation company, rent property managed by TDA affiliates, contract with seemingly legitimate businesses that pay protection money to TDA, or work with vendors who have TDA members on their payroll. The designation requires businesses to implement enhanced due diligence procedures, particularly in regions where TDA is known to operate, including areas of Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and increasingly, northern Argentina.
CONCLUSION
The Tren de Aragua's evolution from a Venezuelan prison gang to a transnational criminal organization, and now to its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, represents one of the most significant developments in Latin American organized crime in recent years. The organization's unique franchise model, coupled with its ability to leverage Venezuelan migration patterns and adapt to diverse operational environments, has demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability. From its origins in Tocorón Prison to its current presence across multiple countries, including the United States, TDA has shown an unprecedented capacity for expansion and evolution.
The February 2025 FTO designation creates new challenges for U.S. businesses operating in Latin America, requiring enhanced due diligence, sophisticated compliance programs, and careful attention to supply chain management. Companies must now navigate complex legal requirements while maintaining efficient operations in regions where TDA maintains influence. The designation's broad scope and strict liability standards make this particularly challenging for businesses across multiple sectors.
However, this development also presents an opportunity for positive change. The increased scrutiny and coordinated international response to TDA's activities may lead to more transparent business practices, stronger compliance frameworks, and improved regional cooperation in combating organized crime. As businesses adapt to these new requirements, they can build more resilient operations and contribute to the broader effort to promote security and legitimate commerce throughout the Americas. The challenge now lies in balancing effective enforcement with practical business operations, a goal that appears increasingly achievable through coordinated international effort and private sector adaptation.